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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

moot.

Nevertheless, the Organizations sought civil penalties against the
Cities for past violations of the CWA. The Minnesota District Court
then faced the question of whether citizens could rightfully file suit for
such retroactive civil penalties as well as whether assessing penalties
retroactively could possibly redress the Organizations' injuries or
prevent further violations of the CWA.
The court first considered whether civil penalties could redress the
Organizations' injuries or deter future violations. A request for civil
penalties becomes moot if the court can no longer grant relief that will
redress the injury claimed. Because the CWA makes all civil penalties
assessed pursuant to citizen suits payable to the United States Treasury,
assessing penalties would not result in awards to the Organizations.
Therefore, the court held, such penalties did nothing to redress their
injuries. Furthermore, the assessment of civil penalties is warranted
only when they "encourage defendants to discontinue current
violations and deter them from committing future ones." Here, the
court held since the Cities had permits, they did not continue to
violate the CWA.
Next, the court considered the power to sue for retroactive
penalties. It held such power fell outside the purview of citizen suits
and, thus, belonged only to the government. Citizen suits, at most,
allowed for civil penalties only if commenced during ongoing
violations. Here, the eventual issuance of the NPDES permits stopped
the violations, thus barring the Organizations' right to sue for civil
penalties.
Lacking any proof that penalties would redress injuries or deter
violation, and lacking the power to bring a citizen suit for retroactive
penalties in the first place, the Organizations' claims failed and the
court accordingly dismissed the suit.
Dan Wennogle

United States v. Buday, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001) (holding
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers did not overrule the Clean Water Act protections of
tributaries of navigable waters, and such protections were
constitutional).
On August 11, 1996, Mr. Buday dug ponds and created burns near
Fred Burr Creek in Granite County, Montana. Fred Burr Creek
flooded in the spring of 1997, destroying the bums, and draining the
ponds. This sent dirt and debris into the surrounding wetlands and
downstream into Flint Creek. Mr. Buday was indicted, and pled guilty
to violating the Clean Water Act ("CWA") by releasing pollutants into
navigable waters, including wetlands.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court limited the definition of
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"navigable waters" in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Core of Engineers. In light of this decision, Buday submitted
a brief claiming Fred Burr Creek and the surrounding wetlands were
no longer navigable waters, and the United States thus lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him. The court construed this brief as a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion, and
in so doing, found the holding in Solid Waste inapplicable.
In Solid Waste, the Supreme Court held seasonal ponds or wetlands
that were entirely within one state's borders and not adjacent to any
navigable steams or tributaries were not navigable waters within the
meaning of the CWA. However, the district court found that this
definition did not apply to the wetlands surrounding Fred Burr Creek.
Although Fred Burr Creek was not navigable, it drained into Flint
Creek, which in turn flowed into the Clark Fork of the Columbia River.
The Clark Fork was navigable-in-fact; thus Fred Burr Creek was a
tributary of a tributary of a navigable waterway. The CWA specifically
covers such tributaries, and the court cited numerous cases, including
United States v. Texas Pipe Line, which found tributaries such as Fred
Burr Creek within the scope of the CWA envisioned by Congress.
Furthermore, the court held the inclusion of tributaries in the
CWA fell within the boundaries of congressional power dictated by the
Commerce Clause, authorizing Congress to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce. By definition, navigable waters are channels of
interstate commerce. The court reasoned that although Fred Burr
Creek's effect on interstate commerce was minimal, the effect of
tributaries as a whole was not. Thus, in protecting tributaries in the
CWA, Congress was protecting the interests of interstate commerce.
Since Fred Burr Creek was a tributary of a navigable waterway, it
was protected by the CWA even after Solid Waste. Since this protection
is within the powers constitutionally granted to Congress, Mr. Buday's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied.
James Siegesmund

Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001) (holding
lack of entitlement prevented citizens either from enjoining the
implementation of the Bureau of Reclamation's annual plan for a
water project, or from forcing releases for irrigation without a showing
of probable chance of success on the merits.)
The Upper Klamath Lake ("Lake") provided primary storage for a
limited-capacity water project ("Project") established in 1905. It also
served as a valuable resource to Indian tribes as well as a source of
nourishment and life for endangered and threatened fish and birds.
This suit arose out of problems concerning the allocation of water to
irrigators holding contracts for water from the Project.
The project allowed the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") to

